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Moral conflicts, cultural diversity, religious pluralism: we – the
Courts – are often called to solve very divisive controversies on the
place of religion in the public sphere. Religious obligations may
conflict with legal rules and we, the Courts, are bound to enforce the
legislation in force. Yet, among the legal and constitutional
principles that Courts are expected to protect, freedom of religion
takes a relevant place. Courts are in the uncomfortable position of
being required to enforce general legislation and to protect freedom
of religion at the same time.
Indeed, Courts in liberal democratic countries of the XXI century
are committed to religious freedom, pluralism and religious
minorities.
However, a comparative analysis show that different courts take
* These reflections were prepared for the Keynote Speech of the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of Comparative Law in Washington, October 2017. The
style and format of the text reflects the original spirit of the oral presentation.
** Vice President, Italian Constitutional Court
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different approaches and come up with different outcomes, even if
they are committed to the same basic values of constitutional
democracies.
Let us take two recent, very similar cases on religious headscarves
in the workplace. The United States Supreme Court decision in
Abercrombie (2015)1 and the decision of the Court of Justice of the
European Union in Achbita (2017).2
Abercrombie refused to hire a practicing Muslim woman because
the headscarf that she wore in light of her religious obligations
conflicted with Abercrombie’s dress policy.3 The Supreme Court
responded by making a clear statement in favor of religious freedom,
articulating, “An employer may not make an applicant’s religious
practice . . . a factor in employment decisions. Although an
employer is surely entitled to have a no-headwear policy as an
ordinary matter, such-neutral policies are required to give way to the
need for an accommodation.”4
Achbita was a case that originated in Belgium, where a Muslim
receptionist had been dismissed because she refused to take off her
religious veil, which was forbidden by her company’s internal rule
that prohibited the use of visible religious, political, or philosophical
signs.5 In this case, the decision of the European Court of Justice
was unfavorable to the worker.6 The European Court finds no direct
discrimination because all workers were treated in the same way, all
being required to dress neutrally. The Court accepts that there might
be a case of indirect discrimination, because of the disparate impact
1. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
2. Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, (Mar. 14, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188852
&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=554787
(concerning the issue of employment discrimination related to an employee’s
decision to wear a veil).
3. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. at 2031 (citing evidence that the district
manager advised against hiring a woman because her headscarf violated the
company’s “look policy”).
4. Id. at 2033-34.
5. Case C-157/15, Achbita, paras. 11-16.
6. Id. para. 45 (holding that a private entity may establish internal rules
prohibiting the practice of displaying religious or political affiliation).
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that the general policy has on some religious groups such as Muslims
and Jews; nevertheless, the Court concludes that the image of
neutrality of the company amounts to a legitimate purpose that might
justify a restriction of freedom of religion.7
As these cases show, all western countries are facing the challenge
of living together in a plural context, in shared spaces, without
erasing diversity nor scarifying equality. However, different
countries are exploring different avenues.
Here I would like to contrast the European “hard line” based on
strict neutrality and antidiscrimination law, as Lady Brenda Hale has
recently put it, with the model of accommodation – notice: not
exemption - based on the language of balancing and reasonableness.
I. PLURALIST SOCIETY AND NEUTRALITY
Neutrality and antidiscrimination are hallmarks of the mainstream
approach to religion in the public space in Europe. History matters.
After the reformation, the old continent has been ruled for centuries
under the principle of cuius regio eius religio.8 Each country had an
official or, a majoritarian religion: most protestant countries in the
north of Europe, most Catholic in the South, the Anglican in
England. After the Revolution at the end of the XVII century, France
became strictly secular.
In such a context, for a long time, the constitutional glossary of
pluralism has focused on the majority-minorities relationship: the
many and the few. Minority groups were under strain because the
general legislation was framed following the dominant ethical values
and beliefs. In that context, the mission of Courts was clear. They
had to open the door to diverse cultures and religions.
7. Id. para. 38 (clarifying that a practice which has disparate effects is allowed
as long as the practice has an objective and legitimate aim such as the pursuit of
religious and political neutrality for those who work with customers).
8. James Turner Johnson, Live & Let Die: Can Political Indifference To Mass
Atrocity Be Overcome By Law or Responsibility To Protect?: Humanitarian
Intervention, the Responsibility To Protect, and Sovereignty: Historical and Moral
Reflections, 23 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 609, 619-20 (2015) (describing the term as
recognizing the right for rulers to establish the parameters for religious practice
within their domain).
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As a response, neutrality became the fundamental tenet of
pluralistic liberal democracies. Neutral public institutions and
legislation appeared to be the logical solution to the problems of the
clash of cultures as they offer a legal framework aiming at
safeguarding equi-distance towards different ideas of a good life.]
Overtime, historical experience showed that neutrality was
defective and deceptive. It was neither able to fix the conflicts of
pluralistic and fragmented societies, nor to provide solutions
respectful of the rights of believers and non-believers alike. This
was for two reasons. First, because neutral legislation can have a
“disparate impact” on different groups and, therefore, produce a
discriminatory effect (as in the cases of Abercrombie and Achbita
quoted above).
Second, because, although it is advanced as promoting an open
space for all, in fact “neutral legislation” is still approved by the
dominant majority culture; in some cases it may produce deliberate
or unintended “neo-assimilationist” effects, inimical to diversity and
pluralism. The case law on religious symbols is a good example. To
this end, we can identify two sets of cases.
First, the cases concerning religious symbols in public buildings:
The preference for a neutral policy suggested to clean up the walls of
all public buildings such as courts, tribunals, schools, hospitals, etc.9
Generally speaking a neutral doctrine of the public space has been
adopted by courts. As a result, religious icons and signs have been
removed.
Later, a second type of cases came to the bench. This second
wave comprises cases concerning personal religious symbols.10
9. See Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91
(1989) (explaining that the government cannot convey or attempt to convey a
preference for any particular religion); see also McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (explaining that the First Amendment
mandates government neutrality in regards to religion and nonreligion); Lautsi v.
Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 60 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104040 (explaining that only a small number
of European Union states proscribe religious symbols including France, Georgia,
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
10. See Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 158-62, 166
(2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=003-1503367-1572572 (holding the rights
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Teachers and students wearing their religious headscarves in schools,
in universities and at the workplace; the kirpan in schools and in the
streets; the turban and the niqab at the airport; the cross and other
ostensible religious images worn by workers that are required to
follow a neutral dress code (nurses, hostesses, etc.). These and other
cases are keeping international, European, and national supreme and
constitutional courts busy all over the world. In many of these cases,
courts have applied the same principles that were used in
controversies regarding the religious symbols in public buildings.
The result was that in many European countries the religious
symbols were forbidden. In England nurses and hostesses cannot
wear a cross. In Italy, Sikh believers cannot carry a kirpan,
according to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation.11
In France, no ostensible religious symbol is admitted in public, and
the niqab is utterly forbidden.12
A neutral approach applied to cases on personal religious symbols
simply does not work, because it amounts to an undue restriction of
freedom of religion. In fact, the problem with strict secular
neutrality is that it is inhospitable to religious believers, as Cole
Durham has repeatedly highlighted.13 Others, like Joseph Weiler,
of the applicant to access educational institutions was not infringed when
university officials refused to enroll her in lectures due to her decision to wear a
headscarf in compliance with her religious duties); see also Abercrombie & Fitch,
135 S. Ct. at 2028 (explaining Title VII does not demand mere neutrality but
requires an affirmative obligation on employers not to fail, refuse, or discharge any
individual due to their religious observance).
11. Italian Court Upholds Ban on Sikhs Carrying Knives, BBC (May 15,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39928912 (illustrating the Italian
Supreme Court’s reasoning that migrants who choose to live in Italy should follow
Italian laws).
12. See Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulaion du
visage dans l’espace public (1) [Law No. 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 on
Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public Space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANC ̧AISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 11, 2010, p.
1834; see also Ioanna Tourkochoriti, The Burka Ban: Divergent Approaches to
Freedom of Religion in France and in the U.S.A., 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
791, 803-04 n.75 (2012) (pointing out that despite a report released by an advisory
council, which delineated circumstances under which the niqab could be banned,
the French Parliament enacted a law which banned concealing one’s face in
public).
13. See Durham, W. Cole, Jr., BYU RELIGIOUS STUDIES CENTER,
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have stressed that religious neutrality, in fact, endorses one of the
competing worldviews, precisely one without God.14 More recently,
Ayelet Shachar, commenting on the French ban of religious veils,
noticed that neutrality measures may inadvertently become a variant
of “indirect persuasion,” even rising to “direct compulsion”
reminiscent of the kind that occurred in the past when the State
would use authority to advance the symbols and the practice of a
majority religion, though now such methods are applied to the “new
church” of secularism.15
II. EXCEPTIONS, OBJECTIONS, EXEMPTIONS
In front of these undesirable effects of neutral policies, many legal
systems are making room for new forms of “fair inclusion,” based on
exemptions and accommodation. Here I would like to draw a
distinction between religious exemptions (or conscientious objection
in the European language) on the one hand and reasonable
accommodation on the other.
Moreover I would like to insist that in a time of fragmentation,
reasonable accommodations have a number of virtues to be elevated
to ordinary approach to pluralism, whereas I would consider
religious exemption (and objection) as last resort measures.
Let’s first consider exemptions. The first move of individuals and
groups that happen to feel that “neutral legislation” - like
antidiscrimination provisions - oblige them to compromise their
ethical integrity and to behave contrary to their religious convictions
is to ask for exemptions. Christian doctors that do not want to
https://rsc.byu.edu/authors/durham-w-cole-jr (last visited Mar. 10, 2018)
(highlighting author’s work in religious freedom law and international comparative
law).
14. Alan Brill, Joseph Weiler, Traditional Jew, Defends the Freedom to Affix a
Crucifix, THE BOOK OF DOCTRINES AND OPINIONS: NOTES ON JEWISH THEOLOGY
AND SPIRITUALITY (July 6, 2010), https://kavvanah.wordpress.com/
2010/07/06/joseph-weiler-traditional-jew-defends-the-crucifix/ (demonstrating that
secularity’s claim of neutrality is disingenuous).
15. See Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender: New
Modes of Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Societies, 50 MCGILL L.J. 49, 80-
81 (2005) (criticizing “neutral” legislation that prioritizes the concerns of the
majority group as restrictive and burdensome on members of society that do not
conform with the majority group’s perspective and ideology).
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practice abortions, young men committed to peace that do not want
to join the army, religious charities that do not want to place children
for adoption in same sex couples: the list is well known and can go
on. All these subjects are in a very uncomfortable position; they are
torn: obedience to a religious command is incompatible with
compliance with the law.
In most cases, the legal order grants exemption so that the
religious freedom of minority groups is preserved. Nobody would
like to live in a community that imposes on people the obligation to
commit a sin, to act against their own ethical beliefs, or to infringe
upon a religious duty. But exemptions and objections have some
important downfalls.
First, in many cases exemptions conflict with other individual
rights. Exemption can shift the burden of the religious commitment
of one individual onto another individual, whose rights are, or might
be, undermined. Examples include women looking for abortions,
gay couples that are discriminated against by service providers such
as hotels, bakeries, and religious charities that do not want to offer
their services to them. Granting exemptions means that government
actors say no to civil rights; denying exemptions directly sanctions
groups and individuals for beliefs. Second, as Davide Paris writes, if
not properly regulated, exemptions may turn from a liberal to an
antidemocratic institution, i.e., a sabotage of the law, a form of
predominance of minorities of the majority.16 Exemptions cannot be
granted without ensuring the law’s effectiveness. Third, exemptions
cultivate the sentiment that religion and other ethical beliefs do not
fit in with a modern civilization and liberal democracies, based on
human rights and antidiscrimination principles. Invoking
exemptions also has some costs for those who benefit from them,
because it puts the minority groups, the few, apart, in a position of
marginalization. In other words, following a useful distinction made
by Ayelet Shachar, exemptions head towards a “privatized diversity”
rather than to a “fair inclusion.”17 Fourth, they are a divisive
16. Davide Paris, Il diritto all’obiezione di coscienza all’aborto nel Regno
Unit: Nota a Greater Glasgow Health Board v. Doogan and another [2014] UKSC
68, 3 BIO L.J. – RIVISTA DIBIODIRITTO 199, 199-207 (2015).
17. See Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale From
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instrument. They oppose different groups and tend to deepen the
cleavages among them; the many, who claim the rights protected by
the legislation, and the few that move apart from the social rules and
lock themselves into closets. They bring fragmentation rather than
social cohesion. They do not help living together but keep groups
apart.
Make no mistake, I consider that, indeed, exemptions and
conscientious objection are necessary instruments, as Antigone has
taught over the centuries.18 But they are for exceptional cases (army,
abortion, capital punishment). Moreover, they are last resort
possibilities, invoked when all other ways out have failed. They
cannot become the ordinary approach to disagreement.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO NEUTRALITY AND
EXEMPTION: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION.
LESSONS FROM CANADA
Is there any other alternative to be explored apart from sheer
neutrality and exceptional exemptions? Courts need new solutions
and are looking for them. We are going through times of
fragmentation, clashes of cultures, suspect, and distrust. The kind of
instruments that Courts are looking for are those that can bridge
groups and people together; that foster cohesion.
The Canadian constitutional approach to reasonable
accommodation has important virtues, worth taking into high
consideration. Let’s review once again, the first representative
leading decision on reasonable accommodation: the well known
Multani decision (2006), a case involving an 11 year old Sikh, who
Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 573, 580-81
(2008) (indicating the difference of focus between public accommodation, in
which a state’s focus is on inclusion, and privatized diversity when parties in
dispute turn to private dispute resolution for resolution of legal disputes in
accordance with a group’s religious principles).
18. See Robert P. Lawry, Ethics in the Shadow of the Law: The Political
Obligation of a Citizen, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 655, 690-91 (2002)
(acknowledging Sophocles’ Antigone as an exemplar of civil disobedience when
faced with a decision between obeying an order not to bury her dead brother and
the religious obligation to ensure he was given a proper burial).
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was enrolled in a public school in Quebec.19 The Court considered
whether the boy should be allowed to carry a kirpan, a ceremonial
dagger, in accordance with his religious beliefs, even though this
created potential safety risks for other students and teachers and was
in conflict with the, very reasonable, school board’s prohibition on
weapons and dangerous objects. The kirpan was at the same time an
important, mandatory religious symbol for Multani, and a weapon
for the school.
An approach based on neutrality would have led to the prohibition
for Multani to carry the kirpan, as was decided by the Supreme Court
of Cassation in Italy a few months ago.20 No student should be
allowed to carry a weapon at school. An approach based on
exemption would have led to the opposite result, to the detriment of
the observance of the school’s rules, and to the safety of other
students. The result would be either the sacrifice of religious
freedom, or the sacrifice of safety concerns.
The response in the Multani case was more nuanced. The
Canadian Supreme Court did not follow the absolutist approach of
the total ban, nor did it ignore the requirements of security.21 The
Court cultivated instead an inclusive approach based on balancing
that seeks to mitigate tensions between competing values and
interests. As a result, the Court rendered a decision establishing that
when he goes to schools, the young Multani Sikh is not necessarily
required to remove the kirpan. However for security reasons Multani
was asked to wear the knife under certain conditions: sew it in an
19. SeeMultani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.R. 256,
317 (Can.) (describing reasonable accommodation as the process through which
the parties to a dispute engage in discussion about the circumstances and their
respective positions in an attempt to find a mutually agreeable solution).
20. See Yudhvir Ranal, Italian Sikh to Move European Court of Justice in
Kirpan Ban, TIMES INDIA (May 19, 2017, 7:34 AM), https://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/city/amritsar/italian-sikh-to-move-european-court-of-justice-in-
kirpan-ban/articleshow/58741439.cms (conveying the Italian Supreme Court of
Cassation’s decision to ban the carrying of kirpans in public and its ruling that
“migrants in the western world must also conform to the values of the society they
had chosen to settle in”).
21. See Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, S.C.R. at 259-60
(acknowledging the importance of carefully balancing evidence or threat of
violence or concerns of safety with infringing on a constitutional right).
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inside pocket in such a way that it cannot be easily taken out.22 Since
the decision was released nobody has heard of security problems in
Canadian schools due to the kirpan and the Sikh. This is, for sure, a
successful example of reasonable accommodation.
I see three main attractive features in a judicial approach based on
accommodation, rather than neutrality or exemption, as far as I can
understand the practice of the Canadian court. First, it moves the
controversy from the theoretical to the practical level. Second, it
requires a collaborative disposition from all the parties. Third, it is a
win-win approach.
At the theoretical level, religious cases are often times “hard
cases” if not “tragic cases” (Guido Calabresi23). When we, at the
theoretical level, discuss clashes of values or clashes of rights, we are
easily trapped in a discussion aimed at ranking different values.
Should religious freedom trump security interests? Or should it be
the other way around? Even more sensitive, should religious beliefs
prevail over antidiscrimination rules? Framed at the theoretical level
these issues are toxic for Courts and have no acceptable solutions.
Values are tyrannical, as has often been reiterated by Carl Schmitt.24
They tend to impose themselves in a one-takes-all dynamic. But this
is not acceptable in a constitutional system. We do not want to
protect freedom of religion at any price. Nor do we want to overlook
it, even when other individual rights or other relevant public interests
are at stake. Conflicts of values often drive courts into a deadlock, if
framed in a doctrinal style. However, if we move from the doctrinal
discussion to the practical level, we can see more than two answers,
as we have seen in Multani; what is impossible to reconcile at the
doctrinal level, can be accommodated in practice, in a Praktischen
Konkordanz (K. Hesse): “[t]here are more things in heaven and earth,
22. See id. at 305 (explaining the reasonable accommodation to permit Multani
to wear his kirpan to school so long as it was sewn inside his clothing).
23. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17-18 (1978)
(defining tragedy as the coexistence of differing values within society).
24. See CARL SCHMITT, THE TYRANNY OF VALUES (Simona Draghici ed. &
trans., Plutarch Press 1996) (1959), https://www.counter-currents.com/2014/07/
the-tyranny-of-values-1959/ (recognizing that the existence of both objective and
subjective values necessitates the valuation of certain values at the expense of
other values creating a “tyranny of values”).
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Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy,” Shakespeare would
say.25
Following an accommodationist approach, everybody gains,
although everybody has to accept a sacrifice, without impairing the
essence of the value she or he is defending. The Sikh student from
the Canadian case had to fix the knife to the jacket, and the school
has to accept him bringing a weapon to class.26 Everybody hands
something over, but nobody surrenders or capitulates. Reasonable
accommodation is based on the idea that we all want to live together.
It is not the result of armchair reasoning; it can only work in practice,
face to face. It requires taking into account the specific details of the
circumstances, and the disposition of the parties. It is based on
cooperation and the presence of a third impartial party, who
facilitates reconciliation of opposing positions and helps in finding
common ground. We cannot stress enough the power of
encountering people face to face for bridging different worlds.
Reasonable accommodation is not the realm of absolutes. It is
based on the language of balancing, flexibility, reasonableness, and
requires “practical imagination” (Pierre Bosset27). For all these
characteristics, accommodation is not the equivalent of exemption.
Whereas exemption is an either or approach, accommodation is both
in one. Whereas exemption keeps groups apart, accommodation
bridges people. Whereas exemption can be established in the
abstract (by law), accommodation requires a practical exercise. It is
performative. It is not a pattern that can be repeated but an avenue
that is to be walked each time anew.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some ten years ago, Martha Minow published an interesting
25. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5.
26. See Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, S.C.R. at 305
(balancing security factors, freedom of religion, and the right to equality in holding
that Multani was permitted to wear his kirpan to school so long as it was sewn
inside his clothing).
27. See Pierre Bosset, Complex Equality, Ambiguous Freedoms, 29 NORDIC J.
HUM. RTS. 4, 13-15 (2011) (discussing the multi-dimensional process of
reasonable accommodation includes an analysis of many factors in an effort to
establish “equality through different treatment”).
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article in the Boston College Law Review, where she expresses deep
concern for the growing conflicts of competing values in this
Country and the insufficient answer so far provided by the legal
order.28 The dominant atmosphere all over the world has not
improved since then. She discussed the case of Catholic Charities
placing children for adoption facing the antidiscrimination rights of
same sex couples. She compared different reactions to the same
difficult problem. In some cases, Catholic charities made their tragic
choice, and terminated the adoption practice rather than betray their
firm beliefs.29 They saved their moral coherence, and the state was
not required to grant exemption. But, she commented it was a lose-
lose solution; both sides now have left very vulnerable children with
fewer resources and friends.
In other cases, the same kind of charities have started cooperative
referral arrangements with other agencies, although they withdrew
from direct child placement services. Same case, two different
attitudes. The same case can be approached as a matter of principle,
it becomes a clash of absolutes and brings about a general
impoverishment for everybody and for the society as a whole, or as a
matter of reasonableness and practical accommodation, it favors
inclusion, connections and human flourishing for everybody.
Indeed, reasonable accommodation is not an easy model to follow.
A Euclidean geometrical mind will be not satisfied by reasonable
accommodation. Indeed it is not panacea and sometimes it might not
be able to solve the problem at hand. Sometimes, “tragic choices”
cannot be avoided (Calabresi, Bobbit, Brian Barry30). The idea of
tragic, in the Greek classical culture, occurs when to polarized
28. See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights
Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 787-89 (2007) (observing that accommodations to
one group of persons may appear as governmental preference or favoritism toward
one group and that exemptions to general rules undermine the governmental
purpose of imposing the general rule).
29. See id. at 831-41 (detailing Catholic Charities fight against pressure to
permit adoption by same-sex couples and the ultimate termination of its adoption
practice in response to the pressure by social and civil rights groups).
30. See Brian Barry, Tragic Choices, 94 INT’L J. SOC. POL. & LEGAL PHIL. 303,
305 (1984), https://doi.org/10.1086/292534 (describing a tragic situation as “a
situation in which, according to some given set of values, unresolvable value
conflicts come into play”).
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position are irreconcilable. Creonte and Antigone cannot find an
agreement, as we can read in the evergreen text by Sophocles.
Tragic choices cannot be always avoided, but are to be limited. As
the Ancient Greek civilization reminds us, tragic positions always
bring about death and destruction for everybody.
Avoiding tragic choices implies an open disposition of both parties
and, indeed, it is not for a court or for the law in general to generate
such a positive attitude. It is for the individual, the groups, the
people, the communities, the public officers. But yes, it is for the
court and for the law to create the legal framework where these
attitudes can come forth, be praised, encouraged and become good
practices to be followed. Making room for reasonable
accommodation within the wording of the legal precepts is indeed in
the power of Courts.
